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This paper aims at presenting a simple model of local decision-making based on the 
hypothesis of “constrained” monopoly power on the part of local governments. It adds 
the contribution of the principal-agent theory by assuming that: (a) monopolistic 
behavior is constrained by voters’ efforts to monitor the outcomes of policies; (b) local 
governments’ policies affect local property values. An empirical test of the model for 
the Portuguese local authorities indicates that the hypothesis of “monitoring” may be 
accepted and that of capitalization can only be accepted in relation to local public 
services not to local taxes on property.    
 
1. Monopoly power and principal-agent theory 
 
The political economy models that have focused on the analysis of local politicians’ 
monopoly power are inspired by Brenner and Buchanan (1980), according to which 
monopoly power is reflected on the maximization of public revenues. This behaviour  is 
the result of absence of competition, both in the political arena and in the supply of 
public provision. More recently, at the local authority level, other studies worth 
mentioning, such as Ashworth and Gemmell (1996) on the UK case: They show that 
there are information asymmetries both between central and local governments and also 
between the latter and their constituents. Those asymmetries allow local governments to 
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set higher local tax levels than it would be possible in a full information setting. 
According to microeconomic theory, monopoly power is associated to a market where 
there is just one big supplier,  in a context of absence of competition owing to the nature 
of the good or service provided, to large economies of scale and/or barriers to entry. The 
monopolistic organization obtains a profit by setting a high price and providing a level 
of service smaller than the socially desirable output. The extent of monopolistic power 
depends upon the nature of public regulation (agency) thus, upon the control that is 
exerted over its activity.  
Likewise, in the case of local authorities, the exploitation of monopolistic power may be 
reflected by the fixation of high levels of local taxation. The degree of exploitation has 
been shown to be directly related to:  (a) the size of local authorities, (b) the political 
support for the incumbent parties or the size of seat majority (which determines the 
degree of political competition); and (c) the possibility that local authorities have of 
shifting the political costs of tax increases to higher levels of government. 
Principal-agent theory offers interesting insights into the analysis of local government 
behavior by focusing on the efforts of local constituents (voters) to impose constraints 
on government or bureaucracy monopoly power. The agency approach to this setting 
stems from the analogy of local authorities’ activities with those of a firm where, 
managers are agents who are expected to fulfill the principals interests (stockholders), 
i.e., by maximizing profits 
2. However, the agents hold most of the information and may 
pursue their own self-oriented goals instead; henceforth, principals should control or 
monitor managers’ actions. In a context of perfect competition, the agents are 
constrained to increase profits, given capital market discipline. However, owing to 
market inefficiencies, the threats of bankrupcy or take over may not be effective in 
inducing profit maximization on the part of managers.  
Applying this approach to the context of local authorities, the incumbent political party, 
which is responsible for local government, acts as an agent while local voters are the 
principals. The incumbent politician faces a threat of entry by the opposition party in 
the next elections, just like the manager in a firm faces the threat of a take over. Control 
of the agents by the principals is limited by the existence of asymmetric information 
and other imperfections of the political system that invests local governments with the 
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monopoly for the provision of public goods. Nevertheless, the greater is local 
government´s discretionary power in setting tax rates and the higher the relative 
importance of local own revenues, the higher will be the accountability of local policies, 
hence, the higher the possibility of control on the part of local constituents. 
Furthermore, the extent of capitalization of local taxes, or its visibility by property 
owners, is likely to determine local constituents’ incentives to control, affecting local 
politicians’ ability to exploit their monopoly power. 
 
2 .  Local constituents as principals in the context of fiscal capitalization 
   
The analysis of principal-agent relationships have been extended to analyze several 
areas of the political market, leading the political economist to study the instruments 
available to the principals to control their agents, such as: 
a)  Developing democratic decision-making processes that increase political 
participation and competition. 
b)  Increasing voters’ control over political outcomes and creating schemes- which 
may include regulations and the institutional organization - that facilitate 
monitoring of the results from public policies,  
As to a), given the existence of several tiers of government and sometimes of complex 
institutional settings (such as, the Congress or parliament committees, bureaus and 
interests groups) which affect political decisions, there is not a simple and single agent-
principal relationship. The institutional approach has been used to analyze the American 
political system; Einswer and Meir (1990) stressed the importance of the rules and the 
particular organization and activities of committees for political outcomes and more 
recently, Poole (1996) uses a similar approach to study the legislative system, analyzing 
the role of legislators as both agents of their constituents and ideologues, while 
Kroszner (1998) analyses the relationship between the organization of Congress and 
interest-group competition. In some of this literature the oversight committees (acting in 
the name of constituents) devise efficient incentive structures to induce bureaus (the 
agents) to produce services/policies that satisfy their constituents. The use of principal-
agent theory to study public administration can be seen in Horn (1995) and Laffin 
(1997), who follow a public management approach. 
In this paper, we take a local public economy view, assuming that the incentives for 
voters to control local politicians depend upon several factors but mainly, on voters’   4
perception of their tax-price. Fiscal capitalization affects tax-price or tax burden so, it 
should also enter the analysis 
3.    
Therefore, this paper shares some of the previously stated hypothesis but introduces 
additional assumptions related to:  
(i)  the control of voters over local authorities’ outcomes; 
(ii) and the existence of capitalization of tax and expenditures on local property. 
As a matter-of-fact, interjurisdictional variation in the degree of capitalization of local 
taxes is liable to affect the real cost of taxation to the residents. As Hoyt (1999) argues, 
in larger urban jurisdictions, that cost may be lower in big cities than in smaller 
localities due to the fact that, in the former, local property tax is only partially 
capitalized, as a result of the weight of other sources of revenue. As a result, if local 
taxpayers perceive a lower burden they have less incentive to control local authorities’ 
policies. Therefore, the existence of higher per capita spending in large jurisdictions - 
implying also higher per capita taxes resulting from greater monopoly power imposed 
by the incumbent politicians - is likely to be related with less voters’ monitoring  due to 
lower tax burdens. This hypothesis stresses the influence of the demand side, differing 
from the traditional hypothesis of the Leviathan.  
As a matter-of-fact, our model of local government behavior has the advantage of 
incorporating and articulating the elements of both the demand and the supply  sides. 
 
3. A model of Local government behavior  
       
We assume that local politicians are self-interested politicians, forming the basis of 
Leviathan governments as opposed to the benevolent type – i.e., the social welfare 
oriented ones. Public choice theory has formulated the leviathan hypothesis in a variety 
of ways: maximization of public revenue, of public expenditures or maximization of 
some sort of surplus, as assumed in the literature, such as in Hamilton (1976, 1978), 
given the assumptions of heterogeneous communities, fiscal capitalization and some 
zoning ordinances. This paper takes a more general approach and incorporates the 
hypothesis that the incumbent politicians are agents of their constituents; they are 
supposed to represent the preferences of the median voter, trying to extract some kind of 
surplus (represented by S), which can be represented by the difference between the 
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benefits from public services and tax revenue, being positively related to per capita 
public provision (g) and negatively related to taxes (t) as tax increases represent a 
political cost for public decision-makers. 
However, owing to asymmetric information and other inefficiencies in administrative 
and political systems, government will try to impose a higher tax rate than the level 
preferred by voters. Assuming that there is a correct tax perception on the part of voters, 
government is constrained to set the average tax rate (t) at a level that is influenced by 
the amount of monitoring (m) on the part of voters, apart from other constraints (Z) 
related to the political and institutional systems and a budget restriction. 
Following on this line, we may formulate politicians’ objective function as  the 
maximization of his constituents’ utility, perceived from his own political interest  (U
p), 
i.e., the desire to increase popularity. Utility (U
P)
 depends on a surplus (S), which is 
represented by a net benefit from local expenditure and tax policies: 
 
             U
 p =  U (S)  
                      S = S (g , t) 
               Subject to:         
                       t = t (m, Z) 
                       t phH  ≥  N g        (budget constraint) 
Where    ∂U/ ∂S > 0,  ∂S/∂g >0,  ∂S/∂ t < 0  ,   0< t < 1 
N is the population size, H is the local property value;  t is the average tax rate, g  is per 
capita local provision of public goods (or per capita expenditures on goods and services) 
and  m  stands for the monitoring level.  
 
4 . Local voters’ utility  
 
Local voters are assumed to be home-owners who derive utility from maximization of 
per capita public goods (g), from private goods consumption (X) and from property (H). 
They evaluate local government policies through the level of public expenditures and 
the effect of taxes on their properties’ values (ph H), which are positively related to 
some types of public spending and negatively related to property taxes (t). This is   
reasonable if we assume capitalization of the property tax and of expenditures on 
property values (or in rental prices, in the case of landlords) , i.e., property values 
decrease as local tax rate increase and increase with the amount and quality of public   6
provision. However, capitalization of public expenditures is often very difficult to test, 
as there are externalities and  distributive effects.  
One of the developments of the principal-agent relationship is the transaction cost 
theory which derives from the fact that the principal has to colect information,  design 
contracts that incorporate incentives to agents and engage in transactions that are 
costly
4. Assuming that local constituents are politically organized, they engage in 
activities aiming at controlling public policies namely, through interest group activities, 
or through political parties, with the objective of monitoring (m) the tax system an/or 
pressing for public provision. We assume that local residents perceive that their effort of 
monitoring is costly,  therefore, they will engage in monitoring when the gain they 
expect to obtain is greater than the cost of monitoring (cm).  Let’s assume a 
representative i
th  individual (who may be the median, as a special but convenient case) 
that derives his utility from the benefits he perceives from public provision (g) and  
from owning property, or housing, (H
i); subject to his budget constraint – income Y
i 
must equal private goods consumption (numeraire, X
i), the rental cost of housing (ph H), 
per capita public spending (g) ( as the counterpart o his property tax burden (t phHi)) and 
to the amount spent on monitoring government (cm m
 i); however, for simplification we 
assume that both Y and X are constant and expressed in numeraire so, in the budget 
constraint, we present Y
i net of  X
i and also net of local tax payed by the ith voter 
(assumed to finance per capita local expenditures g).  
 





                     s. to:   
      (a)            Y
i =  ph
 H
i + cm m
i   
5  
      (b)            H
i
 =  H
i ( h)  
      (c)            Ph = 1/(1+t) 
      (d)            t = t
 (m
i, Z) 
      (e)            m
i =   m
i (cm , L, OP) 
 
U
i  is a monotone concave function and: 
                                  c m > 0,    ∂ U
i/ ∂X
i > 0,   ∂ U
i/ ∂g > 0 ,   ∂U
i/∂ H
i > 0 
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James (2002). 
5 Y
i  is net of local tax and private spenditures (X).   7
                                  ∂ H
i/ ∂h > 0,     ∂H
i/∂ t < 0  ,    
                                  ∂m
i/∂L >0,  ∂m
i/∂ OP > 0,  ∂m
i/∂cm < 0     
 
The individual monitoring effort (m
i) is a function of : 
a)  individual participation in political activities (POL) and lobbying (L), which are 
directed at opposing the potencial increase in taxation; 
b)   and of  the costs (cm) involved in those activities. At the aggregate level, POL may 
be the strength of the opposition to government as represented by the number of 
seats (or its percentage) occupied by the opposition parties in the municipal council, 
and L may be measured by the number of interest groups or the number of events 
promoted by them. House price (ph) depends on the average tax rate t (on account 
of capitalization) and  the amount of housing opted for (H) on housing 
characteristics (h) such as area. 
 
To simplify, let us assume that the representative i
th individual takes per capita public 
goods/expenditures (g) as given and chooses the effort of monitoring (m) to control only 
the tax rate (t). Then, utility (U) is essentially a function of H and m: 
 
(2)  U( H,  m ) 
 
The demand for housing or property (H) is a function of the local property price per 
square meter (ph), which is affected by the property tax rate (t), and the level of this rate 
depends upon the effort of controlling local government (m). Therefore, we can 
represent utility as a function of m. For any given value of m, the amount of H that the 
representative voter needs to satisfy the budget constraint can be represented as the 
following linear function
6; given 1. (a) and solving in order to H: 
 
(3)  H = (Y/ ph) – (cm / ph) m  
 
This is the value of H that will always satisfy the budget constraint whatever the value 
of m is. Substituting this expression for H into the utility function, we obtain the 
unconstrained maximization problem in m alone: 
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(4)     Max m U (m, (y/ph – cm/ph))  
 
We then differentiate U with respect to m and set the result equal to zero, which is the 
same as the optimization condition: 
 
(5)  (∂U ( m, H (m)) / ∂m )  + (∂U (m, H(m)) /∂H) (∂H/∂m) =  0   
 
Now, (∂H/ ∂m) can be obtained by differentiating  (3): 
(6)  (∂H/ ∂m) =  (- cm / ph) (∂ph/∂t)(∂t/ ∂m)       as  ph = ph(t(m)). Substituting into 
(5), we obtain: 
 
(7)   (∂U( ..)/ ∂m) + (∂U(..)/∂H)(-cm/ ph) (∂ph/∂t)(∂t/ ∂m)   = 0,  and rearranging: 
 
(8)       (∂U( ..)/ ∂m) / (∂U(..)/∂H) = (-cm/ ph) (∂ph/∂t)(∂t/ ∂m)        
                  where (cm),  is assumed  to be fixed. 
        This states that the MRS between m and H  equals the relative price ratio weighted 
by   -(∂ph/∂t)(∂t/∂m),  which is the product between the capitalization effect and the 
effect of monitoring, i.e., the marginal increase in their property value from reducing t  
and the inverse of the marginal effect of monitoring on the tax rate ( ∂t/∂m). 
If there is full capitalization of tax, then   ∂ph/∂ t = -1  and given that (∂t/ ∂m) <1, 
we can substitute this hypothesis in (8) to obtain: 
 
      (9)     (∂U( ..)/ ∂m) / (∂U(..)/∂H) = (-cm/ ph) (∂t/ ∂m)  
 
This  means that, under the hypothesis of full capitalization, an utility-maximizing voter 
will increase his effort in one unit at the cost of losing one unit of the other good 
depending on the price ratio and the effectiveness of monitoring upon the reduction of 
the tax rate This condition ensures that  property owners do not face a reduction in the 
values of their properties (phH).   
 The optimal value for monitoring m and for H   could be obtained by solving the 
system of equations given by (5) and the budget constraint  (1) (a). 
    9
Graph 1 illustrates the solution to this problem, showing that the optimal value for 
monitoring (m) chosen by the local representative voter
  should be (m*) in order to 
maximize the utility value (U(me
*)), hence, his property value (H
i). We assume that the 
effort of control (m) does not affect g, so, the surplus (S) for the voters are larger as t 
drops with the increase in m. Assuming monitoring effort on the part of voters, the level 
of the voter´s utility U(m*) is higher than would otherwise be if local politicians 
behavior was not controlled (U(mp). This is a common result in the literature on 
bureaucratic or monopolistic political behavior 
7.  
 
                U 
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           U (mp) 
              
                                mp    m*                             m 
                                                                                                                                  
 
                  t, g                    
                     t
p                                                  g 
                    t
e                                               t 
                                                 
                                                                
                     0         m     m*                                             m 
  
 
    5. An empirical test of the theoretical model 
 
 Our next step will focus on performing an empirical test of the model represented in the 
previous sections. 
Naturally, given the difficulty in obtaining some data, we had to opt for including some 
proxies. For instance, the monitoring effort (m) should include, first of all, regular 
participation in the local political system and secondly, activities of groups of citizens in 
interest groups or associations of various natures. However, we have included only the 
former, assuming that monitoring is related mainly with the proportion of the 
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“opposition” parties represented in the municipal assemblies which we have named 
POL. For property value we chose the value per square meter which is obtained by bank 
evaluations used for housing credit (Vprop). 
To test both the hypothesis of capitalization of local taxes into property value and the 
exisrtence of an agency relationship, we have performed two regressions:  equation [1] s 
assumed to reflect the behavior of local governments which we simplify by assuming 
that their main target is to setting local taxation levels – thus, given the non-availability 
of real tax rates on property, we regress local per capita property tax revenue  (RPpc) 
on: POL (the proportion of members of the “opposition” parties in local authorities 
assembleys), on property value (Vprop), on loans as percentage of total local revenue 
(Emp) and also on an index of municipal wealth, intended at standing for local 
purchasing power (LPP), as shown above:  
 
[1]     RPpc =  a0   +  a1 POL  +  a2 Emp   +  a3 VProp    
 
 
[2]     Vprop  =  b1  +  b1 RPpc +    b2 Med    +  b3 Dpop     +  a4 LPP 
 
Equation [2] is assumed to reflect the interest of local citizens in explaining the value of 
their properties by controlling the policy variables, which are assumed to be capitalised 
into property price Vprop: Property tax revenue (RPpc) and public services (proxied by 
the number of physicians per 1000 inhabitants (MED)). Population density was 
included to represent demand for housing.  
However the first relationship was not significant and Med did not have the expected 
sign.  
We tested an alternative model with only one equation, which is assumed to be able to 
reflect both hypothesis we want to test – the monitoring of LA expenditure policies by 
adding a political variable (POL) and the capitalization of local taxes and local 
provision of public services. 
We have estimated by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method the following 
equation: 
 
                   [3]       Vprop = β0 + β1 Pol + β2 RPpc + β3 Cons + ε      
 
In this equation, the meaning of the endogenous and the explanatory variables is the one 
indicated in the previous paragraphs and ε is the error term of the equation. We added a 
proxy for local public goods - the number of consultations in the health center per 1000   11
inhabitants (Cons), instead of the number of physicians. The results showed that there is 
a positive relation of property prices per m
2 (Vprop) to per capita taxes on property 
(RPpc), to visits to the health center (Cons) and to the representation of opposition 
parties (POL) in the municipal council (“assembleia municipal”). 
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 1. According to the P-values shown  
in the last column of Table 1, we may conclude that the explanatory variables, 
individually, are all significant at the 10% level of significance. The F-value in the last 
line of the table is also significant at the 1% level of significance. So, the set of 
independent variables is relevant for the explanation of the endogenous variable 
(Vprop). However, the R
2 value in the last line of Table 1 is low implying a poor fit of 
the model (the model explains only 33.2% of the variation of the dependent variable). 
 
 








Constant  377.311         179.429  2.10284  [.041] 
Pol  10.7839         3.98150         2.70850  [.009] 
RPpc  580.086         319.867         1.81353  [.076] 
Cons  38.0005         19.7445  1.92462  [.060] 
N=51                 R
2=0.332         F=7.797    [0.000] 
 
Table 1: Results of the estimation of equation []  
     
 
Therefore, we are led to the conclusion that our hypothesis that citizens control local 
authority’s behaviour has to be accepted, given that property value (Vprop) depends 
positively upon the representation of opposition parties in Municipal Councils (POL); 
this variable is assumed to stand for the “monitoring “ effort to control local 
governments’ policies through the political system. However, the capitalization 
hypothesis could not be properly tested as there is a positive correlation between 
property value and local taxes (IPpc). This result cannot be conclusive as we have used 
per capita tax revenue on local property instead of real tax rates on property;   12
capitalization implies that tax rates are negatively related to property values. 
Nevertheless, in Portugal the housing market has many inefficient aspects due to rent 
control and property values are not updated – the latter implies that property tax 
revenues do not reflect the “real” property values.  
 
 
6. Final remarks 
 
The formalization adopted in our model is similar to the ones which represent local 
governments’ monopolistic power or bureaucratic behavior. In all of them, the optimal 
output from governments’ policies, either in terms of public provision levels,   
production costs or, in this case,  the tax rate, is higher than that  which would 
correspond to the preferences of the representative voter. We think that the introduction 
of the agency theory’s assumption - that voters engage in activities to monitor 
politicians - offers an interesting insight into local public choice models that deserves 
further research. Our model was tested empirically for a sample of Portuguese local 
authorities (51 municipalities included in the metropolitan areas of Lisboa e Porto and 
surrounding areas). The results indicate that the hypothesis that local voters monitor 
LA’s policy outcomes may be accepted, although the hypothesis of capitalization of 
local property tax could not be properly tested. However, local public provision do 
influence local property prices in a positive way, as expected. 
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